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NUMBER I

THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE
It has been said of Austin's famous work on jurisprudence

that his conclusions follow with irresistible force if once his
premises are granted. Shall we try to break this welded chain, or
shall we test his premises in the light of recent science? In my
judgment the latter is the only course. Logic has not changed in
fifty years, but a flood of light has been thrown on the ways in
which social life has been upbuilt. The dogmatism of the fathers
does not become the sons. They must test all the cherished
dogmas of departed days.
Austin builds his system without regard for the origin of
the principles he uses. There is ample excuse for this when the
mental attitude of the age in which he lived is taken into account.
English thought had been grooved by the history through which
the English people had gone, and from it had risen a group of
dogmas with a common background to give them apparent unity.
Nothing is harder to dissolve than the chemical union of ideas
that history creates.
To test Austin's premises I shall introduce a contrast he
overlooked. Laws are attractive that of themselves induce regular action, or they are cocrcive when imposed by authority. The
latter, Austin calls positive law, and to it lie confines his attention.
(1)
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The sovereign thus becomes the source of all law, and to him all
regular coordinating action is due. This naturally leads to the
contrast of divine and human law, the law-maker in the one case
being God, and in the other, public authority. * In both of these
cases the power to do right is. fromin above, and the tendency to
do wrong is from below. Grant as a premise the depravity of
man, and the grip of Austin's reasoning begins to tighten. It
becomes irresistible vwhen current notions of theology are blended
with defective views of nature to give positive law a standing.its
contents do not deserve. Back of Austin's logic is a theology aWid
a view of nature open to question. If they are wrong, Austin's
positive law sinks from its commanding place into a. group of
unimportant details.
It is usual to make pleasure the niotive of law, and in a vague
sense it is true. But pleasure has no objective tmeasurement, and
as a result it has little direct effect jn creating law. Economy of
action is really the immediate force, for it is measurable in the
habits and conventions it creates. These forces ate always active,
and grind out their results regardless of sbcihl authofity or personal scruples.
This analysis differs from Bentham's in that it does not put
pain on a par with pleasure in creating law. He makes laws the
result of the sanctions that enforce them, and thus makes all law
the result of the pains that penalize wrong-doing. It is. however,
the fear of pain, not pain itself, which is the law-making force.
Commands take their rise from the fear of evil which the control
of superiors can suppress. If men had no fears; commands would
be of no avail, as they have their sanction in the evils their obedience prevents. I agree with Austin in saying that a sanction is
the evil incurred if commands are disobeyed. There are no sanctions unless the violation of law brings punishment, and punishment could not enforce law without the presence of fear in the
mind of the subject. Commands thus presuppose a defective
world in which fear dominates.
Law is made by the gradual adjustment of men to each
other and to their environment. These relations become a part
of the moral code as social justice, and to it the rulings of courts
and the enactments of legislature must yield. Legislators may
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submit to law or violate law, but they do not make law. Nor
are the decisions of courts law; they are merely precedetts.
Commands must always give way to social law, and thus bring
life into harmiony with the objective processes that create adjustment. God's commands are but a concrete expression of this natural law. The two are one; but men must find the command
through the natural law, and not by the reverse process.
From these facts come a well-defined issue. Austin says a
law is a species of command. I affirm that a caiimand is a
species of law. Back of these assertions lie pictures of the
universe that must be contrasted to make our differences clear.
Austin starts from the concept of an oriental potentate vhose
word is law. This fact is covered up because he speaks in terms
of God's law, and not of human laws. But his concept of
God comes, from Eastern religions where God is pictured in
the garb of an absolute ruler of the kind with which they were
familiar. The concept of God no longer needs such pictures. His laws are not specific commands with definite punishments; they are the expression of the pressure that nature and
society put on men to secure the conservation and advance of
society. Social laws have definite rewards for conformity and
vague punishments for disobedience. Sovereign law, on the contrary, has definite punishments for disobedience and few advantages of conformity. Fear and pain here become dominant
motives, while pleasure remains a vague impulse. Such a picture
of law is a result of the history through which religion and goverunent have gone. \We have broken down the political concepts of this old epoch; we should outgrow the views of God that
have the same source.
The step from this view to mine is a long one, but in confortuity with the advance that has taken place in modern thought.
Man is not in servile relations to a ruler. He is a part of a
process of increasing adjustment. The good of yesterday
becomes the bad of today not because of altered commands, but
because the environment, the needs, and even the nature of man
have changed. The law is thus the force which drives men from
what they are into some better situation. Each new process of
adjustment creates a new law and new motives for its enforce-
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iient. One cannot answer the question as to why lie acts differently today from what he did yesterday by saying lie was commanded. He is moved by forces within and without, and to
them lie must look for the source of his law. Adjustment is thus
the fundamental pressure in creating regular action, and regular
action is the index of the law. Law is therefore not a static unit
to be codified in commands, but the objective expression of all
that act on men in their ascent towards social harmony. There is
in Ihv no sovereign. It is a system of rewards and not of punishments. A new jurisprudence must give this. objectivity to
pleasure before it can gain rational approval.
Adjustment is the external mark of relations out of which
happiness comes. WVe cannot readily test the number of units of
pleasure each person gets, but we can test the growing power to
get happiness by the increasing adjustment that progress secures.
Law is the result of the regular action which the pursuit of pleasure creates. How can these adjustments in activity be measured?
Only in answering this question is jurisprudence carried back
to its source. What forces did Bentham and Austin overlook
which if coordinated in the light of recent science ian give objectivity to social law and thus -dispense with penal codes and appeals
to authority?
The law-making effect of adjustment is shown in the economy it creates. The conservation of energy is a fundamental
human need, and to secure it regularity of action ensues. Each
habit or custom has its origin in the economy its existence promotes. The change comes in the inventive individual, and is
passed along to other individuals by imitation or by the conscious
recognition of the resulting advantage. Then the new economy
becomes the source of family and group action, and finally it
becomes the law of the nation and a part of the moral code.
Long-standing habits can cease to be marks of adjustment, but
then some coercive force is at work counteracting the natural
effect that economy had to improve habits and customs. This
happens when habits and customs are transformed into commands and are perpetuated by the punishment that their infraction imposes.
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One great force in creating social law thus becomes plain.
Adjustment demands economies, and these are transformed into
habits through imitation or experience. Such economies are prevented, or at least minimized, by the existence of strong passions
inherited from the animal world. Rational forces are ineffective
against organic impulses, for the force that counteracts them is
not reason, but sentiment. Passions are natural; sentiment is
acquired. Adjustment cannot by direct means alter passions, but
it can evoke and foster sentiments suppressing them. The transition from a natural to a social state has come through the evolution of sentiments that promote cooperation and brotherly love.
Each new social mechanism produces some sentiment which
increases the hold that society has on the individual. It is this
acquired law, the law of love, loyalty, and brotherhood, that is
of importance as a measure of adjustment. Each new sentiment
indicates some mechanical adjustment that society is making,
which becomes effective when an increase of sentiment, makes
group activity more vigorous. Adjustment is thus measured
through its mechanical devices to increase economy or their
effects in emotion. Both are parts of one whole and are indexes
of the same law-making forces.
These two forms of activity are direct and act on individuals
either through their habits or through their emotions. Authority
and sovereignty are the expression of centralized law. Direct
action, on the other hand. creates decentralized law. No one
formulates the law of a tribe. The motive to conformity acts
on each individual through his habits, language, and emotions.
He acts as others act because he feels and thinks as they do.
Deviations in thought and feeling would create new groups, each
with a common consciousness. This consciousness is the only
binding force, and from it all conformity is derived. In larger
groups, however, this simple force will not suffice. Emotion
emphasizes the small compact group of brothers; interest calls
for larger groupings in which discordant elements, natural and
racial, exist. Economy and emotion now come into conflict.
Self-interest presses for larger social relations than emotion
would evoke. Authority is tlen the expression of this larger
interest coercing the emotions each locality produces. It is ceu-
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tralized. while emotion is decentralized; it is coercive, while the
forces exciting emotion are attractive; it is indirect, delegated or
pragmatic, while emotion is the driving force of direct action.
Neither force can, however, be supreme; and between them an
endless series of compromises is effected.
What we call law is the result of many stages of human
development, each of which has left some mark on juridical
systems. Man did not start his career servile and dependent.
His only law was the direct action imposed by self-interest. Law
in this sense may be defined as interest transformed into emotion
through the pressure of adjustment. Social law demands new
motives and makes a contrast between the impulse that leads to
an act and the consequences that flow from it. The attitude in
doing is moral; the consequence is law. The consequence, and
not the motive, thus gets the first place, and coercive action displaces voluntary effort. Commands are a necessary element in
institutional life.
Social law, however, is not always coercive. A partly centralized form of it is effective in some fields. - Of this type of
law we have many instances, but no name for the phenomena
as a whole. The best-developed part of it is international law,
a term it would be difficult to make general enough to have it
serve as a generic name for all similar facts. I shall therefore
call it federal law, because this term brings out its composition
better than the word "international." The problem of federal
action is to give each group that which it wants most, and to take
from it what is least valued. The essence of federal law is compromise and mutual aid. A net advantage comes to each group
in the shape of a bonus they apprecip'e. The important point
is that the assent is given after tihe consequence is known, and
hence can be accurately measured by each party in its own terms.
The work of a board of labor conciliation is a type of such action.
Here the problem is to find what each contestant values most
and which of his demands are least urgent. Only on this basis
can agreements be reached which will have a compelling force on
each group. Each group then enforces its contracts through its
own emotion. The gain of the united effort is sufficient to give
a net gain to each participant. This is possible in all industrial
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affairs and in many international relations. Larger social and
industrial groups of today are the result of this process, and those
of tomorrow will show the effects of this pressure even more
plainly.
With these views I think most persons will agree so long as
the reasoning is confined to industrial relations. Here it will be
admitted we can get on without a penal code, but not in the more
intricate relations of civil life. The answer I make is not that
we should abolish civil penalties, but that we should seek to understand how they arose and by what means they are continued.
Civil law is the result of a long process of development, of whicti
we can see only the final stage. It thus seems dogmatic and
arbitrary. Austin's commands are so simple that it seems almost
a sacrilege to dissect them in order to show their origin. An,:
yet there was a time when each law was a pragmatic rule to which
all concerned gave assent. The blending of small groups, into
larger ones was the result of interest, and to make the new unity
effective the specific laws of each locality had to be codified into
an organic whole. The general law thus became the law that was
found to be common to all the groups.
We see this process plainly in the formation of Roman law;
if we had the facts it would be found to be equally true of the
law of every composite state. The law of great empires was
not the arbitrary dicta of some ruler, but a codification of existing laws according to pragmatic principles. Of this fact we
have a good example in the Code Napoleon. This was not
Napoleon made, but was obviously a restatement and reorganization of existing French laws. Could we get at the facts, all
seeming commands would dissolve into pragmatic rules, giving
wider application to the principles on which happiness, peace, and
prosperity depend. The command is but a clamor to hide the
identity of the real makers of law, who thus gain a standing
which as persons would have been denied them. A judge is
originally not the enforcer of law, but its interpreter. He gained
his ends by decisions that appealed to both the interested parties,
or to their belief that the new rule was but a broadening and perfecting of that already contained in their customs, usages and
local law. This function the judge still retains. It is true he
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enforces, but he interprets and compromises as well. Effective
law must always be pragmatic in essence and cooperative in
origin. The pains that laws inflict should never obscure the true
source of their power. Modern states need industrial mechanisms and political centralization, but they need equally well the
direct action of emotion and the pragmatic influence of thought.
The real power is in the cmotion and the thought, and not in the
mechanisms that centralization imposes. Emotional impulse and
conscious pragmatic adjustment are the two great forces of
progress, and we neglect then at our peril.
Law thus goes through two stages before it reaches the
mechanical formi which has so great a hold on legal thought. The
direct action of emotion and the pragmatic influence of thought
are not now absent even if their effects are-obscured. Arbitrary
rule is a thing of the past. As cooperative industry displaces the
coercive subjection of the masses, and popular rule replaces class
domination, law will reshape itelf in accord with our inner
motives. Passive obedience is no longer a virtue. Decentralization evokes a bolder spirit which will remold our sentiments to
meet modern needs. To make this view of law clear I shall
follow the example of Austin and put its contents in a table.
L4W
IMPLLSE

CO.VSEQLENCE

Origin

Pragmatic Law
Expression
Federal Law
Positive Law

Attractice Law
Direct Action
Emotional appreciation

Motive
Rewards

Punishments

Artistic

Spirit
Co5perative

Servile

Honor
Fellowship

(Examples)
International law
Commercial law

Centralized industry
Institutional pressure

Loyalty
Thrift
Equality
Self mastery
Fidelity
Service

Group action
Labor unions
Public associations
Social codes
The rules of sport
Legal interpretations

Sovereignty
Penal codes
Constitutional limitations
Executive control
Class supremacy
Judicial power
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From this it will be seen that there are three forms of
action-conventional, direct, and telic; three forms of changereaction, revolution and evolution; three forms of enforcing
law-the habitual, the emotional, and the pragmatic; and three
resulting attitudes-the submissive, the forceful, and the lawabiding. Out of these elements modern society is constructing
the network of human emancipation. Social law is the expression of this new freedom and social service its motive. Centralized authority is the mark of partial adjustment, and, although
we cannot displace it, we may at least reduce its harshness and
severitv. The dissolution of sovereign power follows inevitably
upon the rise of men from a state of helplessness and depravity
to one of personal self-mastery. The problem is to pass through
this stage of transition without the jar of revolution or the menace of reaction.
The means for this peaceful solution of our difficulties lies
largely, if not solely, in the development of a new attitude
towards law, for law is the best expression of orderly growth.
The old and the new in law must therefore be clearly contrasted,
and there is no better way than to compare the premises of social
lavi with those of the older law so ably expounded by Austin.
His law epitomizes the views of nature and of God's rule that
past generations held, which are really inconsistent, since in them
two discordant views of man and the universe have been blended
into one by the pressure of historical conditions. Both concepts,
however, emphasize centralized authority, and hence practically
they are one. God's law is a command, while natural law is a
force; the one predicates the depravity of man, the other his helplessness. Depravity and helplessness are not the same, vet both
call for the same coercive powers on the part of the state, and
develop the same ideas of justice. It matters not whether we
call this law divine or natural, for it is after all clearly representative of an old social order that has been partially, at least, undermined by modern ideas.
Natural law is natural only in contrast with the revealed law
of the Scriptures. It assumes the type of environment under
which primitive nations lived and the motives that control men
in antagonistic tribal societies. To bring it into relation to mod-
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ern needs I shall put in parallel columns the basis on which two
types of jnstice depend.
I. LEGAL versus SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Human nature reveals its Human wants are dynamic.
own impotence, and hence which tendency of itself
the need of external control creates improving forms of
social control -

First Prenise

Source of
Discipline
Reason for
Submission
Measure of

WAR

Vvxotg

SovEIUGN

PRosPary T
INcOMIE

PEACE

Effecli'eness

End to be
Secured

"P onREs
LisExTY

11. NATURAL versus SOCIAL JUSTICE
NATrIAL Jusnica
The doctrine of CoNsERvAinox
SIMUGGLE
POSSESSION
EQUALITY
LAWS VAL Es
PENSOxAL RIGHTS
PFxE Co-nTRcTs

Natural justice causes the same in-

SOCIAL JUSTICZ
The doctrine of PossEssION
SOCIAL VALuES
A LmXG WVAcZ
EQuALIzED ADvANTAGz
SuPExioR ADVANTAGE

PmsocvAL EQuIT
A SocAL MODz
Social justice restricts both extremes

dividuals to be eliminated or subor- of society, thereby increasing the
dinated and the same individuals to prosperity of the socially intermesurvive and prosper as would happen diate.
in a state of nature.
QUESTIONS
Which is the more important, Is social justice secured by direct
Equality of situation or Equality of action against recognized evils or by
wider application of the principles of
person?
progress and prosperity?

This table is self-explanatory, but some sources of misunderstanding may remain. The older view of human nature emphasized its defects, and because of them a sovereign was demanded.
The newer view starts not from human nature which is investigated with difficulty, but from human wants which are easily
measured. The older view emphasized war as the source of
discipline and the means through which character is formed.
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Work gets this place in the newer scheme. Submission in the
older scheme was due to the love or fear of rulers. Today the
only sovereign is prosperity. If we accept a gold standard or a
tariff, if we permit the continuation of monopolies or a money
trust, if we submit to the evils of a rising cost of living or of a
bad distribution of wealth, we do it because it is demanded by
prosperity, and not because of commands froi superiors. We
measure this prosperity in income just as our ancestors tested
governmental efficiency by the peace it brought. Formerly men
strove for liberty and rallied to its call; the new ideas are centered about progress.
The first two doctrines of natural justice are not a part
of divine justice as formulated by religion. They are however
in harniony with modern views of natural processes and deserve
a place on that score. The doctrine of possession is scarcely
altered by being socialized. The great change conies from the
contrast of labor values with social values. The older jurisprudence grew out of primitive conditions where labor was the chief
origin of wealth, and hence the courts view all wealth as the restilt of individual toil and sacrifice. Present facts do not justify
such a view. Everyone is a social debtor and should account for
what he gets from society when he asks society to consider his
claims. The primitive man thought he received his income
through his contact with nature, and hence viewed his income
as self-made, and not as society-made. In the latter case a
budgetary relation exists between each man and society, the
assets of which have a social origin.
Superior advantages are localized in ways that permit of
their exploitation by a few. The right of the state to prevent
an exploitation of the masses follows from this fact. Those who
possess local advantages must yield control when public advantage demands a general use of local resources. A case of this
kind is now awaiting decision by the American people. The
State of Columbia controlled the region where the Panama
Canal is building. What compensation is due Columbia?
Under the doctrine of sovereignty Columbia has unlimited
claims, which could, if recognized, block the building of the canal.
Is there any difference between the right of a nation to a neck
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of land that prevents international commerce and its right to prevent the free passage of ships through a straight that borders her
shores? We refused to pay tribute to the loors in Africa, and
to Denmark for entrance to the Baltic. Shall we pay tribute for
a similar right to cross the Isthmus of Panama?
The application of the doctrine of equalized advantage is
of importance as it affects both external and internal trade relations. A protective tariff is an attempt to equalize environmental advantage. By it the local advantages of particular
regions are taken from their possessors and distributed more
widely among the workers of the world. If these local advantages have a social origin, this process has a justification. The
same problem arises in internal trade in connection with transportation. The rates to the seaboard are fixed not on the basis
of cost, but with the view of equalizing the trade of various
cities. New York has the highest rate; and other ports have rates
inversely to the cost of transportation. This is a case of equalizing advantage. It has a justification if the local advantages of
each city and transportation route are not the result of the labor
expended by the people interested in the various cities or routes,
but are socially created. A good rule for foreign commerce
would be: Give to all sections the same advantage and to each
section some advantage over the outside world. The same rule
in internal trade would be: Give to each section an equal advantage in production and transportation, and to each section
some protection for its local advantages. Such principles are
only partially recognized in the courts and by legislators, but will
in time gain general recognition. The doctrine of a social mode
deserves a co-ordinate place with these axioms. In any combination where nature or evolution has had a controlling influence,
the numerical arrangement of its unit is such that the larger nuniber will be at the center, with a reduction in numbers as the
extremes are approached. This can be represented in a curve
rising at the center and falling off in each direction. This center,
called the mode, should grow at the expense of the extremes.
The social mode of any group is its organized element-the
trade union, employers' association, and industrial groups of all
sorts. Their action represents the progressive part of each social
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unit. The individual has no rights against the mode of his
group, unless the group itself is convicted of unsocial acts. Cutthroat competition and sweatshop workmen represent survivals
whose elimination is desirable.
If this analysis is correct the primary basis of all law is in
the direct action that is enforced by emotion, and its social expression is in the federal law to which blending groups or growing nations assent. The positive law of Austin, on the other
hand, is the result of mechanical action brought about by centralized authority. In principle there is a gulf between these vital
sources of law and its mere mechanical expression in statutes or by
the courts. The difference between Austin's scheme and mine,
however is not great, and the passage from one to the other is
easily made. The reason for this is that Austin is not true to
his premises in the system of law lie develops. With him laws
are in theory commands and the expression of the centralized
power of a sovereign, but in practice Austin does not follow
Hobbes in accepting the word of the sovereign as final. Such
an acceptance would narrow public law as the verbal inspiration
of the Scriptures narrows divine law. Austin never looks to a
sovereign as the source of law in the way so many religious
teachers turn to the Scriptures to find God's word. Law really
comes from the re-interpretation and unification of old codes,
and not from the personal power of a sovereign. Jurisprudence,
lie tells us, "Is the science concerned with the exposition of the
principles, notions, and distinctions which are common to systenls of law," and to make this emphatic he puts it in italics. In
doing this he has wandered from his original principles and accepted a doctrine that undermines them. WVllat are these "principles, notions, and distinctions" but the doctrines that arose in
decentralized communities througl; the general assent of their
members, and were made a part of general law when these comniunities were blended into a centralized state?
The law is older than the authority by which it is enforced.
It came from the people and is given back to them renamed and
repolished. This was true of. the judicial system that the
Romans built; it is equally true to-day. Law must be restated
so as to express the social thought to which people assent,
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but ior which law has as yet not found a fitting expression. The
new law will not be an arl)itrary creation, but simply the social
recognition of principles which smaller organizations than the*
state have already put in operation. Growing groups always
make law by a re-statement of their underlying motives and activities. What each group does of its own volition is more
clearly seen in the new codification than in the original form.
The concrete formulation of many disjunctive actions becomes
the general law with the growth of language and thought that
permits abstract expression. The law is thus a growth and a distillation, not a command. Centralized action merely expresses in
general terms what co-operation and emotion have worked out
in detail. And the agent in this change is not the sovereign, but
a group of legal expositors who have no other power than the
rightness of their judgment. So long as the judge represents the
public, their assent is his only authority, and their welfare his
only basis of judgment. It is the enforcement of statute law,
not its expression, that chains him to precedent and lowers him
from his position as a creator to that of a minion of absolute
power. These two functions are really distinct, even if
blended by long-standing usage. A court can never disregard its
original function without sinking into contempt, for its social
power is always greater than its political power. When it makes
the latter supreme, it forces the evolution of law into emotional
channels and checks the growing dominance it should exercise.
Emotion is final, but it should not be supreme. The pragmatic influence of social ends should transform action from revolutionary explosions into a means of orderly evolution, and the
court is the best vehicle to secure this end. Legislation is often
but a crude groping for a change that the forethought of the
judge should have clearly seen. In the free working of smaller
associations the principle is ever at hand which is needed for the
expression of socialized action. The social law is never new; it
is the group law clarified and restated. And who is so well fitted
for this work as the judge, if he would but free himself from the
trammels of precedent and convention?
The distinction I have made between federal law and restrictive or penal law has long been recognized. It is merely put
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here into a new forn to meet modern conditions. The juris
gcnthin of the Romans and modern equity have at their basis the
equality and assent that -ocial law demands. Its source is not a
lawmaker but the firmly established rules of earlier societies.
There could be no equity if there were no principles to which
both parties had previously given assent. The formula may be
different and in a language peculiar to ead religion or belief, but
the essence must be the same or a reinterpretation of the common
element is not possible. Federal assent is thus a stage in lawbuilding through which all fundamental concepts must go. The
first pressure towards law comes from economy and emotion, the
second from mutual assent The transition from this law to
coercive codes comes through the centralization that mechanical
action imposes on growing states in the process of unification.
The reverse process takes place when nations have passed
beyond the elpoh of coercive unity into a realm where decentralization again becomes dominant. Then sovereignty is dissolved,
coercion is restricted, and penal codes lose their importance.
This decentralizing process is plaily visible in all recent political
action. Voluntary action has an increasing power, and the will
of smaller groups is imposing itself on the nation through the
blending of local interests into a new social law.
From this striving the concept of social justice arises. It is
not a formulated code derived from natural or any other predetermined conditions, but rather the consensus of present social
activity brought to a common consciousness by the similarity of
local struggles foxz social betternent. Direct action is thus the
force back of the change and mutual assent the form through
which the new movement shows its power. To these changes the
formulated, codified doctrines of past ages must yield. The
courts must get their rules not from frigid law books, but from
the vital forces of industrial life. He is the best judge who rises
above tradition and establishes a new equity between. the discordant elements now striving for supremacy. Prosperity is the
important fact in the evolution through which all groups are
going. Each industrial group has already developed some
element of the new law suitable for general adoption, while each
needs as well some restraint to be furnished by the social codes
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that others have adopted. Out of the readjustment will come
unity, but not'of the old coercive type. The emotion and welfare
of the masses are brought into harmony when legal thought,
losing its dogmatic quality, becomes a pragmatic expression of
progressive evolution.
We are often told by judges that their province is rigidly
to interpret legal doctrines. If they prove inadequate, the legislator and not the court, should provide a remedy. Social legislation -is, however, based on emotional demands, and cannot be secured except by an agitation promoting revolution even if it does
not create it. The choice is between emotional justice with its
evils, and the acceptance of social principles by the court. Slavery
in Europe was abolished, not by a sudden revolution, but by increasing the restriction that in the end made slavery unprofitable.
In the same way we should secure a living wage. The evils of
low standards could be removed if the courts took a liberal view
of the law and economic facts involved. There is no prescribed
division of powers between the legislative, judicial and executive
functions which can be accepted. The natural evolution is for
the executive and the judicial to encroach on the legislature. In
this way emotional outbursts are prevented, and orderly evolution displaces the crude countermovements of revolution and reaction. The people should pass on what is done, but popular
initiative is bad because emotionally impelled. An ideal state
would be simpler than our republic, and make less use of legislation.
Simon N. Patten.
University of Pennsylvania.

